Dear RN list, June 4 Karlheinz Koppe sent us a most interesting article to follow up on the question posed by Hans Sinn re: why Germany would have helped cause the disaster in the Balkans (cf. RN posting of May 14, '99) I was interested to learn a bit more about who the author, Karlheinz Koppe, is and I'm sure you will as well. He is now 70 years old and has cooperated with Hans Sinn on many issues relating to civilian defence and voluntary peace services. He was the director of the German Society for Peace and Conflict Research from 1971 to his retitement in 1995. He also served as chairman of the German branch of Pax Christi from 1987 to 1995 and Secretary General of the International Peace Research Association IPRA from 1993 to 1997. It seems clear that his early experience of WW II influenced his later involvement in peace research, for Karlheinz was a deserter from the German army (at the age of 15!) early in 1945. The homepage of IPRA is: http://www.copri.dk/ipra/ipora.html And now on to the article: ***************************************************************** Date: Sat, 29 May 1999 13:40:00 +0200 From: karlheinz koppe <•••@••.•••> Subject: Re: German Responsibility for the Kosovo War There are lots of reasons, most of them miscalculations, that incited the then German Foreign Minister Hans Dietrich Genscher (to whom I pay my highest respect for his performance as Foreign Minister in all other matters, especially in promoting the Helsinki process which led to the Organization of Security and Cooperation in Europa - OECD - and finally to the end of the Cold War) to start the destablization process in the Balkans by a premature recognition of Croatia's secession from Yugoslavia. I would not subscribe to a sort of conspiration theory or longtime deliberated strategy. The miscalculation of Genscher (followed by most other Western political actors) belongs rather to the phenomenon described by Barbara Tuchman as "The March of Folly" (New York, 1984 - the German title is still more instructive: Die Torheit der Regierenden, The Folly of Those Who Govern), but once the process [was] initiated, others, especially the US Administration, [took advantage] - this time indeed deliberately - of the opportunity to destroy Yugoslavia for many reasons and among them economic ones not the least. I would add that neither the German Federal Government nor the White House and the British Prime Minister calculated the disastrous consequences (the atrocities of the "ethnical cleansing", the huge numbers of refugees from nearly all parts of the former Yugoslav Republics) despite serious warnings from peace researchers, peace activists, and even foreign ministry and military experts: The Western Governments wanted a heap of small quasi-sovereign Balkan States which they thought more easily to dominate und economically to control. But instead they got a destabilized region of which the reconstruction, once the Kosovo war [ends] (no one knows when and under which conditions this may happen), will become a heavy economic and political burden not only for the region but for the NATO allies as well. And it will become a special burden for the Federal Government, if one considers that the majority of refugees tries to enter and to stay in Germany. I doubt whether these burdens can be be set off by economic incentives exspected from the reconstruction process. (1) the diplomatic miscalculation Genscher against all advices from the experts of his own Foreign Ministry and - at this time - from the US as well as from France and Britain sincerely believed that an early diplomatic recognition of Slovenia's and Croatia's independence from Yugoslvia would stop the military action of the central government in Belgrade by which the Yugoslav Government hoped to end the secessionist moves in the Yugoslav republics, because at the very moment of the existence of a sovereign Croatia (and Slovenia and later of Macedonia and Bosnia) these actions would have become an aggression banned by the UN Charter. And indeed Belgrade (Milosevic) stopped the military activities and left the fighting to the Serb minoritiy in Croatia, which succeeded at first by the proclamation of the Serb Republic of Krajina. >From this moment on, Serbs - in the eyes of the German public opinion manipulated by the Federal Government an the media - became collectively the bad people in the Balkans. When later in the 90es Tudjman crashed the Republika Krajina down and "cleaned ethnically" Croatia, there were no serious protests from Germany. No one cared at this time of the 350,000 to 400,000 Serbian refugees, no one offered Belgrade any assistance to cope with this problem. In Slovenia this strategy did not work, because the Serb minority there was too small, the country being ethnically rather homogenous. Later, in Bosnia-Herzegovina, the Serbs followed the same tactics and proclaimed the Republika Srbska with the covert support from Belgrade. When finally under heavy German pressure the European Union agreed on December 17, 1991 to recognize Croatia on January 15, 1992, in order to gain another fortnight for negociationg a compromise, Genscher personally decided to declare this recognition prematurely on December 23 as a "Christmas gift" to the Croat people. Rumours say that this early recognition has been agreed by the White House in return for the German financial contribution to the costs of the Gulf War II (some billions of dollars). (2) The economic background Croatia was of special interest for Germany since up to this time most Yugoslav "Guest workers" came from Croatia for three reasons: first, many Croat families had good knowledge of the German language due to the long time political relationsship with Austria and to the alliance with Hitler Germany after the occupation oif Yugoslavia in 1941, when the fascist Ustasha regime was installed with German support (see point 3). Second, geographically it was easier to go to Germany from Croatia than from other republics. Croatia was the wealthiest part of Yugoslavia and many German big and small industries invested in Croatia in order to profit of the cheap labor. Third, Croatia was the tourisst regionm especially by the fact that the long Dalmation coastline belongs to this country. Hundred of thousands, if not millions of German families spent cheap holidays in Croatia. There was consequently a strong German interest to support Croatia's independence so that the income send by the guest workers and from the tourism remained exclusively in Croatia (prior to this time these incomes have been distributed by the central government among all republics) and became an additionmal source for German investments. Something similar happened to Slovenia which became - seen the historical and economic ties - practically the "tenth Land" (provincial state) of Austria. (3) Traditional nationalistic links Croats are considered as close friends of Germany because they have fought during both World Wars on the German side. After the occupation of Yugoslavia, because Serbs overthrow the Yugoslav Monarchy when it tried to join the German-Italian "Axis", Croatia became a fascist Republic (including Bosnia-Herzegowina!) which behaved towards Jews, Serbs, Gipsies and Muslims even more cruel than the German SS divisions. Some hundred thousands of Serbs has been murdered between 1941 an 1945. But the Federal Government continued and still continues to favor Croatia in a spirit of "Nibelungentreue" (faithfulness until death). After 1945 the Ustasha chiefs could continue their propaganda from Vienna and Munich without any intervention from the Austrian and German authorities. Finally the Croats were emotionally privileged as Catholics, while the Serbs are Orthodox, a split which dates back to the Seventh Century. It is said that the Vatican intervened strongly at Genscher in favor of the recognition of Croatia's independence. (4) The Serbs as traditional enemies of Germany In the same way as Croats are presented in the German public opinion as "traditional friends", Serbs are presented as "traditional enemies" of the Germans (in Austria and Germany alike). The Serbs remember that the outbreak of WW I started with a "Strafaktion" (punishment) against Serbia because of the assissinate of the Austrian "Thronfolger" (crown prince) July 1914 in Sarajewo. They remember the second "Strafaktion" April 19141 when Serbs refused to join the Hitler alliance. Until today the brave and heroic Serb resistance against the German occupation ist hardly mentioned. This resistance was much more effective and successful than the resistance movemnets in France, Norway or Italy. We shoulöd therefore not be surprised that the Serbs consider the German support to Croatia in 1991 as a third "Strafaktion". And the participation of the German Air Force in the bombing of Serbia just now reminds them inevitably the bombing of Belgrade by Hitler's air force on April 6 and 7, 1941. Taken all these considerations together I can only state that the German Federal Government is highly responsible for the starting of the destabilization of Yugoslavia. It may be true that at the beginning all NATO governments were convinced that the dissolution of Yugoslavia will not end in a war that goes into its tenth year. There was therefore no political follow up assessment. Especially the White House thought that the independence of Croatia was some gift to the Federal Government for its loyality to the USA. Once engaged in this process the US became very quickly the leader in this aventure still believing that the air raids will end Serbia's role within a couple of days - a real March of Folly. In the subconscience of many Germans and deliberately in the minds of many political actors on the Right as well as on the Left (Greens included, where we find conservative ecologists, liberal economists and leftist pacifists) we see a sort of satisfaction that Germany participates in the Kosovo War. Joschka Fischer compared the Serb policy against the Kosovo Albanians with the Holocaust/Shoa - a scandalous and wrong comparison, because the Holocaust is a terrible but unique example of a meditated and systematic liquidation of a whole people, precedented perhaps by the liquidation of Armenians by the Turks between 1915 and 1923 - Fischer relativated later his statement in saying that it is a duty of Germans to avoid another Auschwitz (Nie wieder Auschwitz!), but there is no other Auschwitz in the Kosovo - the feelings of many Germans seem to be: We are finally not the only people who is responsible of an Holocaust. There is still an other feeling: Now many Germans feel freed of the stigmatism of war criminals: We may not be better than others, but at least we are not worse than others! So the participation of the Bundeswehr in international wars, especially in the Kosovo, is considered as an historical set-off of this stigmatization. Many Germans are proud that this time we seem being on the right and bright side together with Americans and Britons, we are no longer losers but winners. It is true that the Federal Government - for the moment - refuses to be engaged in a ground combat, but this attitude can change quickly once the Americans would be in favor of a ground attack. It is also true that the Federal Government, especially the green Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer and the social-democrat Defense Minister Rudolf Scharping, urges for new political-diplomatic approaches. They are questioning NATO to investigate carefully why and how the Chinese Embassy could have been hit by NATO rockets, because if there was on an old city map of Belgrade no Chinese Embassy indicated, as NATO officers pretend, but only a park (without buildings) why bomb a park? This insistance and the apologies of Chancelor Schröder in Beijing did not please neither the White House nor Solana. The motivation behind the German reluctance is that the Federal Government fears that the still general approval of the Kosovo war in the German public opinion may diminish in the case of a ground combat. And this general approval is still needed for domestic reasons: it gives the Federal Government an opportunity to hide its failures in nearly all political matters. The Kosovo tragedy is the consequence of just another March of Folly. Whe NATO started to threat with air raids, Milosevic, well knowing that he cannot stand the military potential of the NATO, decided to use a criminal and inhuman weapon - chasing, violating, killing Kosovo Albanians: for every NATO bomb one hundred Albanians. We are now at 10,000 bombs - corresponding to one million of chased Albanians! Who can stand it longer? Milosevivc the terrible bombing terrorising more and more Serbs or the NATO governments coping with a million or more refugees threatened by starvation and epidemies? (One will not find many comments of this type in German papers because reasoning in this way is considered as a "Nestbeschmutzung" (fouling of ones own nest) and an injury to German interests and political standing. There is no censorship in Germany, but a hidden censorship in the minds of most actors and medias. I fear that the German anti-Serb policy together with similar politics in the US and in Britain will be the most important handicap for any equitable solution on the war in the Kosovo. The indictment of Milosevic before the Court in The Hague, as just as it may seem, is another prove that NATO does not want a political solution of this war but a "victory" for which more than a million of Albanians and hundred of thousands of Serbs will have to pay.) ******************************************************* Dr. h.c. Karlheinz Koppe Senior Lecturer at the University of Muenster Wurzerstrasse 136 D - 53175 Bonn, Germany Tel&Fax: +49 (0)228 363603 email: •••@••.••• ******************************************************* Si vis pacem, para pacem *******************************************************
